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Abstract
We revisit recent results from the area of collusion-resistant
traitor tracing, and show how they can be combined and im-
proved to obtain more efficient dynamic traitor tracing schemes.
In particular, we show how the dynamic Tardos scheme of
Laarhoven et al. can be combined with the optimized score
functions of Oosterwijk et al. to trace coalitions much faster.
If the attack strategy is known, in many cases the order of the
code length goes down from quadratic to linear in the number
of colluders, while if the attack is not known, we show how the
interleaving defense may be used to catch all colluders about
twice as fast as in the dynamic Tardos scheme. Some of these
results also apply to the static traitor tracing setting where the
attack strategy is known in advance, and to group testing.
1 Introduction
Suppose a distributor of streaming digital content wishes to sell
his content to customers. To do this, he may encrypt the stream
and grant paying customers access to the live stream to prevent
others from freely accessing the data. However, a malicious
customer may try to broadcast the stream directly to non-paying
users by creating a pirate broadcast, possibly making money out
of it as well. To prevent this, the distributor may embed unique
watermarks into the content for each user, such that when a
pirate streams his copy of the content online, the distributor may
detect it, extract the watermark from the content, and see who
is the pirate.
Things become more complicated when several pirates col-
lude and mix their copies of the content into a new stream, with
a sequence of watermarks that is not equal to any of their in-
dividual sequences of watermarks. Under the assumption that
in each segment, these colluders can only output one of their
watermarked segments (known as the marking assumption), it
is still possible to trace collusions of any size c, by carefully
choosing which watermarked segments each user should get,
and designing an algorithm that traces (the watermark of) the pi-
rate stream to the set of colluders. In the setting of live streams,
the assignment of watermarks for the next content segments
may be adjusted based on the previous pirate output; we call
this the dynamic traitor tracing setting. The scenario where the
assignment of watermarks to users has to be done completely in
advance, and where users may only be disconnected from the
stream at the end, is often referred to as static traitor tracing.
The latter scenario may for instance apply to video on demand.
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The goal of collusion-resistant traitor tracing is to use as few
watermarked content segments as possible, while still being
able to trace the users guilty of creating the pirate broadcast.
1.1 Model
The above dynamic traitor tracing problem is often translated
to the following mathematical model. First, we assume there
is a set of n users, c of which are colluding to create the pirate
output. We assume that in each content segment, the distributor
is able to embed up to q different watermarks, with q  n often
referred to as the alphabet size. To each segment and each user,
the distributor assigns one of q watermarks. This assignment is
denoted by a code matrix X = (Xj,i), where Xj,i = k means
that in segment i, user j receives the kth (out of q) watermark.
After distributing the ith watermarked segments to all users,
the set of colluders chooses one of their segments and outputs
it, along with its watermark. We denote the sequence of water-
marks in the pirate output by a vector y = (yi). Then, the dis-
tributor detects yi, and uses this information to possibly discon-
nect some users that he thinks are guilty. After this, he chooses
the next content segments Xj,i+1, possibly based on the previ-
ous pirate output yi. This continues until no pirates are left to
output one of their segments, or until we have reached the limit
of the number of watermarked segments. We say a scheme is
successful if, within an a priori fixed amount of segments `, it
is able to guarantee (with high probability) that all colluders
are caught, and no innocent users are accidentally disconnected
along the way. We write ε2 for the probability of not catching
all colluders, and ε1 for the probability of ever disconnecting at
least one innocent user.
1.2 Related work
Fiat and Tassa [1] showed that if the alphabet size q satisfies
q ≥ 2c+1, then with ` = O(c log n) segments, one can find and
disconnect all colluders deterministically, i.e., with probability
of error ε1 = ε2 = 0. This scheme is very efficient, and the only
drawback is that it requires a large alphabet size, which may not
be possible in practice. Tassa [2] later showed that combining
the binary (q = 2) static scheme of Boneh and Shaw [3] with
the dynamic scheme of Fiat and Tassa [1] leads to a binary dy-
namic traitor tracing scheme that uses ` = O(c4 log n) content
segments. Due to the large required length of the code, this
scheme is not practical.
Recently, Laarhoven et al. [4] showed that the celebrated bi-
nary static scheme of Tardos [5] can be converted into a dy-
namic binary scheme, with a code length of the order ` =
O(c2 log n). Together with the divide-and-conquer construc-
tion of Laarhoven et al. [6], allowing for a linear trade-off
1
ar
X
iv
:1
30
7.
02
14
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  3
0 J
un
 20
13
between the alphabet size and the code length, this allows
one to build q-ary schemes with a code length of the order
` = O( c
2
q log n), for arbitrary values of q. For large q ≈ O(c),
this approaches the result of Fiat and Tassa, both in the alphabet
size and in the number of segments needed.
Even more recently, Oosterwijk et al. [7] studied the score
function used in Tardos’ static scheme, and showed how to
choose better score functions when the pirate attack is known.
In one particular case, they came across a score function that
turned out to work well against any attack. More precisely,
for asymptotically large c, they showed that this score function
achieves capacity, i.e., attains the known exact lower bound on
the code length of ` ∼ 2c2 lnn in the binary setting [8]. So
for large c, using this new score function in the static setting
may lead to a decrease in the length of the code of almost 60%
compared to using the symmetric score function of Sˇkoric´ et
al. [9], for which it is known that the asymptotic code length
` ∼ 12pi2c2 lnn ≈ 4.93c2 lnn is optimal [10].
1.3 Contributions and outline
The outline of this paper is as follows. First, in Section 2 we
will revisit the dynamic Tardos scheme, and show how slightly
modifying the scheme leads to a simpler proof and a slightly im-
proved performance. Then, in Section 3 we take a closer look
at the recent results of Oosterwijk et al. and show when and
how these results can be improved and combined with the con-
struction of the dynamic Tardos scheme to obtain efficient dy-
namic traitor tracing schemes. More precisely: we get a greatly
improved performance when the attack strategy is completely
known, as the order of the code length often goes down from
quadratic in c to linear in c; and we heuristically show how to
get the above-mentioned decrease in the asymptotic code length
of up to 60% in dynamic traitor tracing, when no assumptions
are made on the pirate attack. Finally, in Section 4, we summa-
rize the results and mention some directions for future work.
In this paper we restrict our attention to binary, dynamic
schemes, although some of the results may also be generalized
to arbitrary alphabets, or applied to static traitor tracing.
2 The Dynamic Tardos Scheme, Revis-
ited
Let us first recall the dynamic Tardos traitor tracing scheme of
Laarhoven et al. [4], outlined below. The main difference be-
tween the celebrated static Tardos scheme [5] and the dynamic
version of this scheme, is that while in the static scheme we
disconnect a user only when his final score exceeds a certain
threshold Z, in the dynamic scheme we disconnect users as
soon as their scores exceedZ. With this small adjustment, it can
be shown that whereas in the static Tardos scheme at least one
pirate is caught with high probability, in the dynamic scheme
all pirates are caught with high probability.
The construction below depends on scheme parameters `,
Z, and δ (a cutoff parameter on the distribution function Fδ).
Choosing these parameters appropriately depends on whether
one wants provable security or heuristic security. The provable
bounds on ε1 and ε2 are not very tight, as the actual error prob-
abilities are often significantly smaller. Heuristically, one may
therefore be able to use shorter code lengths `, at the risk of not
satisfying provable upper bounds. In this paper we will not go
into detail about choosing `, Z, and δ; see e.g. [4], [11, 12, 13]
for theoretical upper bounds, and [14, 15] for practical estimates
of `.
1. Codeword generation
For each position 1 ≤ i ≤ `:
(a) Select pi ∈ [δ, 1− δ] from Fδ(p) defined as:
Fδ(p) =
2 arcsin(
√
p)− 2 arcsin(√δ)
pi − 4 arcsin(√δ) . (1)
(b) Generate Xj,i ∈ {0, 1} using P (Xj,i = 1) = pi.
2. Distribution/Detection/Accusation
For each position 1 ≤ i ≤ `:
(a) Send to each active user j symbol Xj,i.
(b) Detect the output yi; terminate if there is none.
(c) Calculate scores Sj,i = h(Xj,i, yi, pi) using:
h(x, y, p) =

+
√
p/(1− p), (x, y) = (0, 0),
−√p/(1− p), (x, y) = (0, 1),
−√(1− p)/p, (x, y) = (1, 0),
+
√
(1− p)/p, (x, y) = (1, 1).
(2)
d) For active users j, set Sj(i) = Sj(i− 1) + Sj,i, and
disconnect this user if Sj(i) > Z.
By making the following small modification, one can get a
slight improvement in the theoretical bounds on ` of [4] and get
a simplified proof. The main difference is that scores are only
updated in segments where no one is disconnected.
2d) If there are active users with Sj(i− 1) + Sj,i > Z:
• Disconnect these users.
• For other active users, set Sj(i) = Sj(i− 1).
Else set Sj(i) = Sj(i− 1) + Sj,i for active users j.
Due to lack of space we omit the details, but with this modi-
fication, the proof will not have to resort to using the technical
parameter Z˜ which is used in the proofs in [4]. It now suffices
to prove that in positions where scores were calculated, the av-
erage pirate score will exceed Z. Both error probabilities ε1,
ε2 still increase by (at most) a factor 2, and the code length
increases by an additive term c, but otherwise we can use the
same parameters as in the static Tardos scheme. This modifica-
tion thus leads to a cleaner reduction between code lengths in
the static (`(s)) and dynamic (`(d)) Tardos schemes as follows,
with notation similar to [6]:
`(d)(c, n, ε1, ε2) = `
(s)(c, n, 12ε1,
1
2ε2) + c. (3)
To give an indication of the provable code lengths with and
without this modification: in the example of [4] with scheme
parameters c = 25, n = 106, ε1,2 = 10−3, the number of
segments now increases from 109 585 (static) to only 114 204
(dynamic), instead of the 116 561 of [4].
2
3 Optimal Score Functions, Revisited
Recently, Oosterwijk et al. [7] showed how to obtain optimized
score functions for any attack strategy, maximizing the nor-
malized expected coalition score µ˜ per segment1. For sev-
eral attacks, they showed that this leads to much more efficient
schemes, sometimes reducing the order of the code length from
c2 to as little as c1.5 when using the arcsine distribution for gen-
erating biases pi. As a side result, they noticed that the score
function built against the interleaving attack (randomly choos-
ing a pirate, and outputting his watermarked segment) performs
well against any attack.
In this section, we will discuss these improved score func-
tions, as well as the optimal distribution functions against these
attacks, in several different settings. We first discuss the sce-
nario where the complete attack strategy is either known to the
distributor in advance or can be accurately determined along
the way [16], and how drastically the code lengths may be re-
duced in this setting. Then we will discuss the scenario where
the attack strategy is not known and may not even be the same
in each segment, in which case we show how we may be able
to use the interleaving defense to our advantage.
3.1 Known attacks
If the attack strategy is completely known, we can not only use
the optimized score functions of Oosterwijk et al. [7] to increase
the performance, but also fix the value of p in advance to its
optimal value. After all, if the attack strategy is known and
identical for every column, we can compute the performance of
the scheme as a function of p, and choose the value of p that
maximizes it. Note that using different values of p for differ-
ent columns is required in the ordinary traitor tracing setting,
as an adversary could otherwise exploit this knowledge about p
to build strong attacks. But if we already know what the attack
looks like in advance, then the model should be considered a
randomized model rather than an adversarial model, and vary-
ing p is no longer necessary.
Table 1 lists some common attacks also discussed in [7] and
the optimal choices of h and p for each of these attacks, to-
gether with the asymptotic scaling of the lengths of the codes
in each of these cases. Except for against the interleaving at-
tack, in each of these examples the order of the number of seg-
ments needed to trace collusions goes down from O(c2 log n)
to O(c log n), thus leading to a drastic reduction in the code
length. Below we briefly discuss each of these attacks, and give
some intuition behind the results in the table. Due to space lim-
itations, details on the optimal values of p, h, and the asymp-
totics of ` are omitted here but will appear in the full version of
[17].
3.1.1 The interleaving attack
Against the interleaving attack, the leading term of the code
length does not depend on the choice of p when the interleav-
ing defense is used [7, Proposition 10], and its asymptotic value
is always given by ` ∼ 2c2 lnn. However, minimizing the vari-
ance of the coalition score by choosing p = 12 leads to slightly
1Here, normalized refers to dividing by the standard deviation of innocent
user scores per segment, which we will denote by σ.
smaller first order terms. In that case, the score function reduces
to +1 for matches and −1 for differences.
3.1.2 The all-1 attack
For the all-1 attack (output a 1 if at least one of the colluders
received a 1), the optimal choice of p is given by p = αc , where
α = o(1) should not converge to 0 too quickly, to prevent first
order terms from blowing up [17]. The all-1 attack is directly
related to group testing [17, 18] where testing a pool of samples
returns a positive result iff at least one positive item is present
in the tested pool. Note that we have manually adjusted the
function of [7] from h(1, 0) = −1 to h(1, 0) = −∞, since
if a user has a 1 and the pirate output is a 0, he is certainly
innocent. The asymptotic code length is given by ` ∼ 2c lnn
for this choice of p, while the simpler choice p = 1c leads to
` ∼ 2e(e−1)2e−1 c lnn.
Note that the all-0 attack is equivalent to the all-1 attack with
the interpretation of the symbols 0 and 1 reversed. So we can
obtain the optimal h and p by replacing each occurrence of 0 by
1 and p by 1− p, and vice versa.
3.1.3 The coin-flip attack
Similar to the all-1 attack, the optimal choice of p against the
coin-flip attack (randomly select either a 0 or a 1) is of the order
p = o( 1c ), leading to an asymptotic number of segments of
` ∼ 4c lnn for large n. Again, smaller values of p lead to larger
first order terms, and so a compromise could be to take p = 1c
with an asymptotic code length of ` ∼ 2(e2 − 1)c lnn.
3.1.4 The majority voting attack
For arbitrary values of p and c, the optimal score function tai-
lored against the majority voting attack (outputting the most
common version among the pirate copies) looks quite nasty.
However, optimizing p leads to p = 12 , leading to the trivial
but intuitive score function of +1 for matches and −1 for dif-
ferences. Determining µ˜ turns out to be related to the expected
absolute distance from the origin after c steps in a simple 1-
dimensional random walk, and working out the details leads to
an asymptotic code length of ` ∼ pic lnn.
3.1.5 The minority voting attack
Again, for arbitrary values of p and c, the optimal score function
built against the minority voting attack (always outputting the
least common version among the pirate copies) does not look
very pretty. However, the optimal choice of p is close to 0, in
which case the minority voting attack is almost equivalent to the
all-1 attack. The score function in the Table (which is the all-
1 score function without manually optimizing h) is not exactly
correct, but for reasonably large values of c and small values of
p, the difference is negligible. For p = o( 1c ) the optimal scaling
of ` is equivalent to that of the all-1 attack, while for p = 1c it
is slightly higher due to the manual optimization of the score
function of the all-1 attack.
Other attacks
Finally, for arbitrary other attacks not mentioned above, one can
manually compute the optimal parameters as follows:
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Table 1: Optimal parameter choices for several attack strategies. The plots on the left show P (y = 1 | k) against k, where k ∈ {0, . . . , c} is the number of ones
received by the coalition, when the corresponding attacks are used by the coalition.
Attack Optimal score function h Optimal bias p Asymptotics `
Interleaving attack
h(x, y) =

+p/(1− p) (x, y) = (0, 0)
−1 (x, y) = (0, 1)
−1 (x, y) = (1, 0)
+(1− p)/p (x, y) = (1, 1)
p =
1
2
` ∼ 2c2 lnn
(
p ∈ (0, 1), ` ∼ 2c2 lnn
)
All-1 attack
h(x, y) =

+p/(1− p) (x, y) = (0, 0)
−p(1− p)c−1/(1− (1− p)c) (x, y) = (0, 1)
−∞ (x, y) = (1, 0)
+(1− p)c/(1− (1− p)c) (x, y) = (1, 1)
p = o
(
1
c
)
` ∼ 2c lnn
(
p =
1
c
, ` ∼ 2e(e− 1)
2e− 1 c lnn
)
Coin-flip attack h(x, y) =
(
pc−1 + (1− p)c−1)
p = o
(
1
c
)
` ∼ 4c lnn
×

+p/(1− pc + (1− p)c) (x, y) = (0, 0)
−p/(1 + pc − (1− p)c) (x, y) = (0, 1)
−(1− p)/(1− pc + (1− p)c) (x, y) = (1, 0)
+(1− p)/(1 + pc − (1− p)c) (x, y) = (1, 1)
(
p =
1
c
, ` ∼ 2(e2 − 1)c lnn
)
Majority attack
h(x, y) =

+1 (x, y) = (0, 0)
−1 (x, y) = (0, 1)
−1 (x, y) = (1, 0)
+1 (x, y) = (1, 1)
p =
1
2
` ∼ pic lnn
Minority attack
h(x, y) ≈

+p/(1− p) (x, y) = (0, 0)
−p(1− p)c−1/(1− (1− p)c) (x, y) = (0, 1)
−1 (x, y) = (1, 0)
+(1− p)c/(1− (1− p)c) (x, y) = (1, 1)
p = o
(
1
c
)
` ∼ 2c lnn
(
p =
1
c
, ` ∼ 2(e− 1)c lnn
)
Unknown attacks
h(x, y, p) =

+p/(1− p) (x, y) = (0, 0)
−1 (x, y) = (0, 1)
−1 (x, y) = (1, 0)
+(1− p)/p (x, y) = (1, 1)
p ∼ Fδ ` . 2c2 lnn
??
• Compute the optimal score function h [7, Cor. 7 and 8].
• Determine the performance indicator (σ2/µ˜2) as a func-
tion of p, and choose the value of p that minimizes it.
Choosing `, Z, and δ as a function of h, p, and c is not so easy,
and as mentioned before depends on whether one wants prov-
able security or only heuristic bounds on the error probabilities.
Doing this analysis is left as an open problem.
Remark 1 Looking at the examples above, we notice that the
optimal choice of p seems to be closely related to where the
pirate strategy has the biggest jump in the probability of out-
putting a 1 (cf. the graphs in Table 1). For instance, in the all-1
attack, this jump occurs between kc = 0 and
k
c =
1
c , and the
optimal choice of p is indeed between 0 and 1c . When the pi-
rates use the majority voting attack, a jump only occurs when
the fraction of ones goes from slightly below 12 to slightly above
1
2 , and indeed the optimal choice of p is exactly
1
2 . Note that ex-
cept for against the majority attack, the asymptotic code length
scales as ` ∼ 2c ln(n)/β, where β is the size of the biggest
jump. For instance, for the all-1 attack and minority attack, we
have β = 1; for the coin-flip attack we have β = 12 ; and for the
interleaving attack we have β = 1c . This also illustrates why
the interleaving attack is very strong.
Remark 2 The above results can also be applied to the static
traitor tracing setting to reduce the number of segments needed
to catch colluders, but also to guarantee that all colluders are
caught with high probability. In fact, the above asymptotics for
` also hold for static traitor tracing if c = no(1), although the
convergence to the limit is considerably slower. For instance,
the above parameters for the all-1 attack lead to improved non-
adaptive (static) group testing schemes. For details, see [17].
3.2 Unknown attacks
If the attack strategy is not known to the distributor, he has to
choose h and the distribution function F such that any attack
can be dealt with efficiently. An obvious suggestion would be
to use the dynamic Tardos scheme with the score function re-
placed by the interleaving defense, as the interleaving defense
is asymptotically optimal. However, we run into some practi-
cal issues when we try to do this, since the interleaving defense
does not satisfy the same nice properties as the Tardos defense.
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If we use the Tardos score function, we know that σ2 = 1, and
so we can fix the threshold Z in advance (based only on c, n,
ε1, ε2) and get the proof methods of [4] to work. But if we
use the interleaving defense, we only know that σ2/µ˜2 ≤ 1 for
arbitrary attacks and large c, but we do not have any accurate
estimates on σ2. In fact, this parameter not only depends on
the scheme parameters, but also on the attack strategy, which is
unknown. For instance, using the minority attack leads to large
values of both σ and µ˜, while the majority attack leads to small
values for both. Thus, using a fixed threshold Z does not seem
to work.
3.2.1 A heuristic construction
We present a heuristic solution as follows, where the trick is that
we vary Z throughout, depending on σ. During the scheme,
we keep track of the average innocent standard deviation per
segment σ¯(i) =
√
1
i
∑
k≤i σ
2
k, where σ
2
k = pkh(1, yk, pk)
2 +
(1 − pk)h(0, yk, pk)2 can be computed based on pk and yk.
Then, after each position i, instead of using Z as a threshold,
we use Z(i) = Z · σ¯(i) as the threshold for disconnecting active
users. The rest of the scheme remains the same.
In Figure 1 we show some experiments using this construc-
tion, where we used the same parameters `, Z, and δ as in the
dynamic Tardos scheme (which could be considered a conser-
vative choice). Several attacks are considered with extreme val-
ues and fluctuations of σ, but in each case the scheme seems to
work well, as all pirates are caught sooner than in the original
dynamic Tardos scheme.
3.2.2 Possible issues
Although the scheme seems to work well, we mention some
theoretical issues with this scheme.
The Gaussian assumption Whereas in the Tardos scheme
scores in each segment are identically distributed, the same does
not hold for the interleaving defense. Some segments inevitably
contribute much more to a user’s overall score than other seg-
ments, due to varying values of p. Therefore, the assumption
that the total user scores behave somewhat Gaussian may not
hold, and the tails of the score curves may be bigger than ex-
pected. For instance, in Figures 1d, 1e, and 1f, some positions
cause both the green and the red curves to go up more that in
other segments. Note that this issue exists for the interleaving
defense in general, i.e., also for the interleaving defense applied
to static traitor tracing.
Asymmetric attacks Related to the above, colluders may
use column-asymmetric attacks (i.e., change their strategy over
time) that cause large fluctuations in the parameters µ˜ and σ
over time. An attack may for instance consist of first using the
minority attack to cause σ to go up, and then using the majority
attack to make the value of Z go down. This could possibly
lead to innocent users being disconnected, because of their ini-
tially high scores. Figures 1e, 1f suggest that such attacks are
not very effective, but again, simulations do not guarantee that
there is no other way to exploit this issue.
In both cases, choosing the cutoff δ sufficiently large seems
crucial. In the original Tardos scheme things may already go
wrong if the cutoff is too small, but in the case of the interleav-
ing defense, the effects of small values of p are much more ex-
treme. Not using a cutoff may lead to explosions of user scores
when p happens to be very small and the pirates still manage
to output a 1, and in general a too small cutoff may cause huge
fluctuations in σ and µ˜ in different segments. But if we do use
an appropriate cutoff, as we did in Figure 1, these issues might
not cause any practical problems at all.
Finally, note that if we were to normalize the scores in each
segment, to avoid the two issues mentioned above, we end up
with the Tardos score function again. So using the Tardos score
function may still be a practical choice to guarantee theoretical
security and avoid these possible issues mentioned above. But
heuristically, using the interleaving defense seems pretty safe,
and can lead to drastic reductions in the code length.
4 Conclusion
To summarize the most important contributions of this paper:
• By making a small modification to the construction of the
dynamic Tardos scheme, we get a simplified proof and a
slightly improved performance.
• Against known attacks, optimizing p and h may lead to
much faster tracing of collusions. The asymptotic code
length often decreases from quadratic to linear in c.
• Against unknown attacks, we can use the interleaving de-
fense and the arcsine distribution with cutoffs to catch ar-
bitrary collusions much faster, by varying Z throughout.
• Some theoretical issues exist with the interleaving defense,
but experimentally these issues seem less relevant. How-
ever, using sufficiently large cutoffs seems crucial.
An open problem remains whether the interleaving defense can
provably withstand arbitrary attacks. For now, it seems that
using the interleaving defense is quite safe and very efficient.
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(f) The interleaving defense vs. The min/majority attack
Figure 1: The dynamic interleaving defense in action against several attacks, together with one example of how the original dynamic Tardos scheme roughly
works against arbitrary attacks. In this case, we used c = 10 and n = 102, ε1 = ε2 = 10−3 as the simulation parameters, leading to ` ≈ 14 150, Z ≈ 650,
and δ ≈ 1/350. The green area contains all innocent scores, the red lines show pirate scores, the bold purple line shows the average pirate score, and the bold
blue curve shows the threshold Z(i). The maj/minority attack consists of using the majority attack on the first 3000 positions and then switching to the minority
attack, while in the min/majority attack they start with the minority attack and end with the majority attack. Note that the numbers on both axes are different in
each figure, so both the number of segments needed to catch all colluders and the order of magnitude of user scores are different in each example.
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